Explaining Equipmentality in Being and Time

“The first rule of Ontology is you don’t talk about Ontology”: the Consistent Logic in Heidegger’s Conceptions of Umsicht, Equipmentality, and the Ready-to-Hand

Philosophy can take many forms, whether it be as logical investigation, an ethical dilemma, or hermeneutic analysis. Yet one thing which commonly unites these fields as “philosophy” is, arguably, its practical value in our lives. Studying logic can ensure rational or consistent thought in our day-to-day life, just as ethics defines how you and I should interact with each other. One of the inherent benefits of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy is a similar practicality, and relatability– a primary instance of this is in regard to his understanding of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, and their relationship with understanding what he calls “circumspective concern”, or Umsicht. This paper will demonstrate how Heidegger uses the “same” rationale to understand the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand as he uses in part II of the introduction to Being & Time’s “re-arranging” of the priority of ontology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. This will then make reconciliation possible regarding the contradictions one may find in reading Being & Time, such as the “inaccessibility” yet simultaneous “disclosure” towards our circumspective concern of our world, all in a manner that remains faithful to Heidegger’s practical roots.

We will begin by making clear two key components to Heidegger’s thought: firstly, the primordiality of ontology in philosophy. Secondly, the implicit rejection of Cartesian dualistic tendencies in philosophy prior. Tackling the former, he writes that “the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic, in the primordial signification of this word”(62). To summarize, studying Dasein, that is, the “entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of its possibilities as being”(27), can only be done as phenomenology. We can only answer the question of being by looking at ourselves and our experience, as anywhere else we look (i.e., the hard sciences) would be confined by a phenomenology. Similarly, we can only study that phenomenology by employing a “hermeneutic”, or interpretation. “Language is the house of being”, after all, and “studying” or “describing” phenomenology can only be done with a language, which leaves said study open to interpretation, disagreement, and discourse. Despite all this, our investigation is still fundamentally an ontological investigation, as Heidegger’s philosophy contains a transcendental element where Dasein interacts with an “outside world”, and the fundamental ontology of that world is what Heidegger initially set off to uncover in Being & Time. This “outside world”, however, is not “separate” from Dasein, which marks Heidegger’s rejection of Cartesian thought.

Heidegger’s critique of Descartes is one that is inherent to his philosophy.  In fact, Heidegger’s philosophy encourages us to reject the influence of Cartesian thought on modern and contemporary philosophy. Arguably, Heidegger’s most important critique is regarding Descartes's conception of the world. Heidegger writes that “Descartes sees the extensio as basically definitive ontologically for the world”(122). (Extensio, or res extensa, being Latin for “outside”.) Descartes, as he demonstrates in the Meditations, can “logically” negate the existence of a knowable world, and assert that the “outside world” is inaccessible to the mind. Heidegger explains further that “Descartes not only wants to formulate the problem of ‘the “I” and the world’; he claims to have solved it”(131), this solution being the ontological argument for God. This argument asserts that we can imagine a perfect being, and the only thing more perfect than that imaginary one is an actual perfect being, therefore that being must exist. Kant would go on to preserve the subject-object distinction, further cutting the world off from us by arguing that “mere existence” is not a quality of something, since everything would already have that quality. Heidegger’s problem with Descartes, then, is not with the ontological proof of God, but the skepticism and dualistic ways of thinking that persist even in philosophy today. Heidegger rejects Descartes formulation of the “subject and world” by alternatively proposing the way Dasein exists in and with the world by using equipment, which Dasein “perceives” in Umsicht, or circumspective concern. 

Unlike the Cartesian subject, Dasein fundamentally has a relationship with the world by engaging itself towards and within the world; Dasein and its world intersect. Heidegger writes explicitly that “‘world’ is… an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand in the world”(93). Dasein, being ontico-ontological, as it is an entity which can contemplate its own being, inherently interacts with the world. This is arguably more practical than a skeptical Cartesian approach to philosophy, as instead of beginning by formulating a “proof” for the res extensa with God, or wiping it all away with the uncrossable Kantian phenomena-noumena divide, Heidegger offers an alternative that immediately gets us access to the world. Dasein incorporates the concept of worldhood as an existential of Dasein, that is, an ontological component; Heidegger explains that worldhood is “that referential totality which constitutes significance”(160). This significance, no doubt a hermeneutic one, is dependent on the Dasein, it’s care or concern, and life-projects which differentiates Cartesian dualism from Heidegger’s philosophy. A student who rides their skateboard to class and takes notes during a lecture has a specific relationship to the world and its entities– this principal relationship is what we may call “circumspective concern”. 

Heidegger writes that “circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand”(159). “Concern”, or care, here, means whatever a Dasein directs itself towards via its life-projects. Circumspection is Dasein’s active participation in the world of ready-to-hand entities, and care “designates” both how we view, or understand the entities; the student utilizes a pen, computer, or skateboard differently from an artist, software engineer, or professional skater. This is to say that while the entities themselves may “factually” remain the same, across the different Daseins’ worlds, their ontological involvement in the world, due to the Dasein’s directed care, remains distinct. To reiterate, circumspection is Dasein’s personalized orientation of the “totality of equipment ready-to-hand”(147), as Heidegger describes the process of “discovering space non-circumspectively” where ready-to-hand space  undergoes a dissolution when made present-at-hand. Present-at-hand is the disclosure of entities; calling a chair “a chair” defines a specific “being” of that entity. Sure, a cup might have been made “for the purpose” of drinking something, but a decade later, it may end up as a pencil holder forgotten on a desk. Only when a friend inquires on its now faded logo, do you remember, by disclosing the ready-to-hand assignment of the pencil holder, a circumspective “blind-spot” within the present-at-hand that was the ‘cup’ (the specific “towards-which” of the ready-to-hand entity is fluid, but remains constantly “ready” nonetheless), the “initial” being of the present-at-hand entity: “that is a Batman cup.” Its assignments are revealed in the disclosure of how the cup has changed since its initial “towards-which”.

Heidegger further explains what happens to circumspection when equipment goes missing or breaks, writing that “when equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the ‘in-order-to’ to a ‘towards-this’ has been disturbed…when something is unusable for some purpose — then the assignment becomes explicit”(105). Because engaging with entities ready-to-hand inherently requires a “focus”, where one isn’t thinking about the specifics of gripping a pencil to write, or turning up or down your car’s volume. We engage with these entities because we aren’t thinking about them “specifically”, or present-at-hand. However, when the phone battery dies while calling someone, or if the class homework goes missing the minute you’re supposed to leave, then the “web” of circumspection is revealed. Each entity and its “assignment” is made clear because, when the entity is missing, our only reference to it can be through its disclosure as “present-at-hand.” An entity may not be physically or spatially with us, but its mere mention calls upon the entity present-at-hand relative to our world now (one where that mentioned object is no longer near us or ready-to-hand) 

In this sense, the ready-to-hand can never be the starting point of investigation, as it will always come in the form of the present-at-hand, seemingly rendering a paradox between the inaccessibility of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand.  Heidegger explains that “the ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme”(99). Heidegger uses the example of a farmer who sees the south wind as a sign of rain to demonstrate that the wind here “becomes accessible only through its readiness-to-hand… It is never present-at-hand proximally in such a way as this”(101). His point is that ready-to-hand entities will remain so until it's disclosed in our circumspection as a sign of rain.

We can see a consistent method taking place here in Heidegger’s philosophy, hearkening back to the priority of studying Ontology as fundamental only by using phenomenology and hermeneutics in a “transcendental” manner. It only makes sense as to why this occurs, as the ready-to-hand is encountered ontico-ontologically, in that its being as an entity is determined by Dasein’s Umsicht and the world’s ontical or “factual” status. Heidegger, recognizing the impossibility of “directly engaging with” ontology, made sure to work the logic of studying ontology by way of phenomenology, and of course hermeneutics, into his ontological system, which in turn dissolves the problems of subject-object dualism, giving us a way to “directly engage” with the world on a level of “hermenetic-significance” and an ontico-ontological level, that is as the present-at-hand and ready-to-hand concepts distinguish.

Heidegger’s philosophy in Being & Time is notorious for both its density and its many “paradoxes” that the reader must overcome, yet this philosophy is invaluable as it serves as a stark contrast ahead of the Cartesian dualistic model of the subject and object, employing a different foundational framework all together. In fact, the “paradoxes” themselves are only such because they come from an “oversight” in Heidegger’s philosophy– Heidegger’s philosophy is built on the logic within the fundamental immediacy Dasein has with its world, that is its engagement with entities as ready-to-hand, but simultaneous distance from the world as we can only disclose these entities as present-at-hand. This philosophy marks Heidegger as a step forward from the dualistic philosophical tradition, moving beyond Cartesian metaphysics. 

Citations

Heidegger, M., Macquarrie, J., & Robinson, E. (1962). Being and time. [San Francisco, Calif.], HarperSanFrancisco.